The nationalisation of the mines, banks and monopoly industries is the policy of the ANC and a change or modification of our views in this regard is inconceivable Nelson Mandela February 1990
we would welcome a debate among the business community on the issue of nationalisation..... I also expect compromises on both sides Nelson Mandela, 1992
The NP [1] elite is getting into bed with the ANC to preserve its silken sheets and the leadership elite in the ANC is getting into bed with the NP to enjoy this newfound luxury.
Winnie Mandela, January 1993
This paper considers the ideological and material changes in South Africa immediately before, during and since the unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC). It will argue that the historic transition of South Africa provides a unique setting for considering the dialectical relationship between the material base and the ideological/cultural superstructure in Marxist theoretical analysis. The paper pays particular attention to the economic situation since South Africa's enormous future potential is inseparable from its economic structure. Essentially, South Africa is faced with the immediate problem of how to transform a crisis ridden economy primarily designed to provide a high standard of living to 5 million whites into a more stable economy which will at very least provide a acceptable standard of living for 37 million South Africans. It will be argued in the paper that an important factor contributing to the collapse of apartheid was the economic situation facing the de Klerk government. Basically, South Africa could no longer afford the apartheid system. The paper singles out privatization and the role of the accounting profession in the privatisation process for special analysis since it is in the discourse surrounding privatization that one can readily perceive the relationship between ideological and material changes in South Africa.
This concern with or conscious privileging of the economic has become at best, unfashionable in the accounting literature. The accusation of economic determinism is enough to discredit almost any research in accounting. This paper does not wish to undermine the importance of many semiological, cultural or indeed ideological aspects highlighted in much of the critical accounting literature, but rather wishes to emphasise the importance of the dialectical relationship between the economic base (capitalism) and the superstructure (culture, language, ideology). The postmodern and some of the more Marxist literature have correctly alerted accounting academics to the "closure" problems raised by giving an "economic definition" of the situation (see for example Arrington and Francis, 1989; Shearer and Arrington, 1993;  [1] National Party Cooper and Hopper, 1988; Cooper 1995) . Put simply, the nub of this problem is that an "economic definition of a situation" will prevent other important ways of understanding the world from being presented (Cooper and Hopper, 1988, Cooper, 1995) . For example during the 1980s UK Coal Dispute, several so-called "loss making" pits were earmarked for closure. Some of the underlying accounting assumptions used in calculating the profitability of these pits were absurdly conservative. It was shown that by altering accounting information to reflect more "realistic" accounting assumptions, the pits involved could, easily be considered to be "profitable". However, the National Union of Mineworkers were unwilling to take on board such arguments preferring to argue on rather different ideological grounds that pit closures would devastate whole communities, or that it was of national importance to maintain UK coal production and so on. One way of understanding this would be to say that accepting neoclassical economic discourse to determine which pits should be closed would mean that other social implications of pit closure would be hidden. In many senses exactly this same ideological battle is being played out in South Africa over the issue of privatisation and other economic "reforms". The newly elected ANC government is confronted with severe structural economic problems. But can, indeed should, Mandela try to convince the people of South Africa, to wait for their legitimate and desperate economic needs to be met, by explaining the real economic situation of South Africa? Or, will this type of explanation prevent other important issues from being considered. Given that the ANC has spent many years convincing South Africans to make their country ungovernable until the demands of "the people" are met, Mandela is walking a tightrope. The way in which the situation in South Africa is defined is both ideological and material; it is ideological in the sense that Mandela will be choosing how to define a situation and material because he is confined by the material base of South Africa and with the increasing globalisation of capital with a world wide economic crisis of capitalism.
The point about the material base is crucial to the arguments in the paper. As will be explained in the next section, there is no doubt that within a neo-classical economic framework, South Africa is faced with immense economic difficulties. Unproblematically accepting this framework will perhaps lead to very particular conclusions. For example much of the right wing press in South Africa is openly arguing that Mandela simply cannot afford to spend whatever proportion of GNP is required to alleviate the desperate social deprivations of so many in South Africa and that State assets need to be "privatised" to gain cash in order to reduce the country's debt burden. In the context of setting the debate in a particular form, there is a relationship between the economic/material and the ideological. But the relationship between ideology and the economic/material is perhaps more fundamental. In this paper we will argue that it is the Capitalist system as the economic/material base in South Africa which dialectically relates to Mandela's ideological changes since his release from prison. With respect to the privatization issue the ANC have travelled a vast distance in only five years. It is likely that, urged on by private sector economists and would-be international beneficiaries that their pace of ideological change will accelerate.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we consider the economic situation in South Africa before and after the unbanning of the ANC [1] . We then consider the [2] The ANC was unbanned on 2nd . This was further exasperated by the staggering levels of unemployment, estimated by the South African Reserve Bank to be around 46% [1] (Kibazo, June 1994) . Even in the mining industry, once the economic backbone of South Africa, and still responsible for 28% of the country's foreign exchange earnings, the numbers employed have fallen by 23% since 1988 to 355,000 (Herbst, 1994) .
The rapid industrialisation of the 1960s created significant weaknesses in the South African economy by the 1970s. Shortages of skilled and semi-skilled labour was becoming a serious problem [1] . The disintegration of the Bantustans policy, traditionally a source of cheap labour in [3] By the mid 1980s political errors and economic inefficiency had produced a profound crisis. The National Party responded by initiating military oppression aimed at sustaining power. In addition they moved towards greater economic intervention in an effort to counterbalance the effects of international sanctions. The economy became more capitalintensive as it sought to achieve self-sufficiency and produce goods as complex as chemicals, computers and armaments. The international isolation meant SA businesses formed closer liaisons with the government initially pressing for reforms and later, removal of President Botha. He was replaced by de Klerk in 1990 who accepted the need for negotiations with the ANC if only to prevent a possible full-scale revolution (Lipton & Simkins, 1993) .
[4] Those facing unemployment are black, poorly educated, with only 38% of black pupils having passed their school matriculation in 1993 compared with 90% whites. Many have had little choice but to opt for the informal sector, becoming hawkers, which their organisation (ACHIB) claims has become part of the fabric of city life in South Africa (Kibazo,1994) .
[5] 180,000 whites have managerial, technical and professional positions compared to 3,000 blacks; there has only been one black mine manager in 77 years (Herbst, 1994) . In 1987 there were only four blacks who became qualified accountants (Financial Mail, 1/3/96) . the rural areas, escalated the flow of black 'illegals' into White urban South Africa, further exasperating competition for scarce resources and sharpening political conflicts. Nevertheless, it was the 1980s which was to produce the greatest crisis, owing to a contradiction between the capitalists' need to accumulate and produce profits and the restrictions imposed by the policies of apartheid (Ajulu, 1993) .
Further, although rarely alluded to, the ANC's reputation for intervention was more than equalled by its previous repressors. Long before sanctions bit in the mid-80s, the apartheid government were already forging industrial self-sufficiency behind high tariff walls and foreignexchange controls. The National Party (NP) needed the State to control economic development in order to accommodate the apartheid system, thereby perpetuating the old alliance of white agriculture and white Labour which in turn strengthened the rising Afrikaner urban bourgeoisie (Murray 1994 , Lipton & Simkins, 1993 [1] . However, the economic costs of the preserving apartheid seemed to rise over time and although there were several attempts to reform the system it was evident by the 1980s that the inefficient use of resources had produced sluggish productivity growth (Moll, 1993) . Therefore, it could be argued that the slow growth of the 1980s could be attributed to factors like the lack of a systematic exporting policy, costly state investment in 'strategic' industry, inadequate provision of education and skills, poorly functioning labour markets. These problems were exacerbated by sustained political resistance (Murray,1994; Moll,1993) . Consequently, what the National Party managed to construct -with the help of a falling gold price and the cost of shoring up apartheid -was stagnation.
Apartheid, accordingly became discredited as a result of the systems' inability to facilitate capitalists' need to accumulate and produce profits. In addition, the response of the Western countries to South Africa's unsteady business climate, namely capital flight and the cessation of international loans, put further pressure on political elites to arrive at a possible alternative basis for political legitimacy (Lipton & Simkins,1993) . Also with the increasing globalisation of capital, South African business "lost out" on international investment opportunities. With the decline of the NP's capacity to manage the state in the interests of its own constituency, and certainly with the prospect of losing power, the NP's intelligentsia began to consider an alternative ideology, namely the 'free market' and a call for 'rolling back of the state'. The essential point here is that this ideological change reflected both the material (economic) and the ideological changes within the rest of the capitalist world in the 1980s.
Therefore the NP was forced to impose constraints on the state in order to create more opportunities for market forces. It began to retreat from the socio-economic aspects of apartheid [1] , and to present this process as part of the shift to a 'free market' economy. This was [6] The concentration of this bourgeoisie can be seen in the large family businesses and insurance companies, who as a result of being blocked from investing abroad, gobbled up local equities to make a complex tangle of cross-holdings with only four groups accounting for 75% of the capitalization of the Johannesburg stock exchange (Economist, May, 1994) . [7] The State began to withdraw from some of its 'racial ordering' activities, for example reducing the controls over the mobility of labour and capital. However, there was still no evident in its promotion of privatisation in the state sector industries, reduced levels of state expenditure, and a movement away from direct government intervention in the economy. In particular, the South African Reserve Bank, the driving force behind the National Party's economic recovery strategy, adopted a strict monetarist policy aimed at cutting inflation, tightening the money supply, and advocating deregulation and liberalization (Murray, 1994) [1] . Accordingly, in the 1990s the ANC inherited an economy which despite being the most vibrant on the continent with a Gross Domestic Product equal to 75% of that of the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, had a catalogue of problems that would test even the most experienced of economists. A recession in the first three years of this decade has further weakened an economy already ravaged by the sanctions campaign, high inflation and inefficient public administration. To this must be added the unrelenting violence which has discouraged investment by both South Africans and foreign businesses in certain areas of the country (Kibazo June 1994) ; even before the ANC drew up its first spending plan, the budget deficit was heading for 7% of GDP.
So what solutions are there for South Africa? For sure, the question of the macroeconomic balance and the satisfying of the legitimate aspirations of the majority who have suffered under apartheid goes to the very core of the dilemma facing the new government of South Africa. Failure to address this problem will result in an unstable economy which will almost certainly effect the political stability of the country. However, the contentious issue is how to forge a process of accelerated development that would raise the country to a higher status of development and relieve the socioeconomic backlogs and imbalances acquired from the past regime (Coetzee, 1993) . The solutions which the ANC are likely to come up with will depend upon the way in which they frame the problem; their concern with maintaining their close links with Trade Unions (Cosatu) [1] and the South African Communist Party (SACP); pressures imposed by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund; and perhaps most importantly, the economic system within which they must operate. Already South Africa's desire to encourage foreign investment, its inability to find trading partners without the capitalist system, has forced Mandela to frame the problem within a neo-classical economic framework. He began telling overseas audiences in mid-1993 that the ANC would be "slow to deliver the goods", but he didn't take that message immediately to Soweto, Khayelitsha or Cradock. Should he have? The changing ideological position of the ANC is the subject of the next section and commitment to a common South African citizenship and the NP still sought to retain control of the State which was the source of many jobs and privileges of the white elite (Lipton, 1993) [8] During the apartheid reign, the state sector absorbed the steel, oil-from-coal production, transport, telecommunications, and the defence industries. At its peak in the 1970s, the state administration employed one-third of all economically active white wage earners. Even after the privatisation of the giant Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCOR), the State sector still owned more than 50% of the country's fixed assets (Murray,1994) [9] COSATU membership climbed from 450,000 at the time of its formation to more than 1.3 million in 1994 with over 1000 full-time officials and more than 25,000 shop stewards (Murray, 1994) . the importance of the ANC's historical relationship with Cosatu (Trade Unions) and the SACP (South African Communist Party), the Tripartite Alliance is dealt with in the following section.
Ideological solutions proposed by the ANC
Until its election the ANC had sought support for its battle against apartheid from widely differing groups.
Congress counts as its constituency Xhosa and Zulu, the unemployed "comrades" in the Transvaal squatter camps as well as Indian sugar planter in Natal, young and old, Afrikaans attempting to farm maize in Kwa Ndebele, black yuppies with their BMWs in Johannesburg and miners working at the coalface. Herbst, 1994, p 148 Whilst the ANC could be characterised as being broadly progressive in its general politics, the commitment to a planned rather than a free market economy, amongst ANC members was in no sense uniform. The organisation was often perceived as anti-capitalist but the vagueness of its rhetoric almost certainly allowed the ANC leadership freedom to hold together a coalition of varying interest groups that included workers, the unemployed, communists, liberals and even the aspiring black business community, with the sole purpose of smashing the apartheid rule. Hence, even after its unbanning the ANC was still not clear about the Post-Apartheid economic order. They had yet to clearly articulate the precise method of achieving the desired redistribution of socio-economic resources, all they could point to at this stage was a batch of propositions contained within the 1955 Freedom Charter (Murray, 1994) .
However, in its early economic policy statements it is possible to identify the ANC's approach to the economy and it almost certainly refers to a fundamental societal change. The ANC's preunbanning 1980s economic policy statement included changes in power relations, a restructuring of industrial relations to improve worker participation; a restructure of demand in favour of the poor through policies to satisfy basic needs; labour-intensive production; affirmative action and nationalization of key industries. On the surface at least, it appeared that the ANC was immune from the ideological changes of the 1980s with respect to privatisation. However, ANC members were clearly not isolated from the ideological/rhetorical changes of the 1980s. Some key members of the ANC within the Trade Union movement were already beginning to use the rhetoric of the market, efficiency, economy and effectiveness, quality circles and so on. These arguments will be considered in the trade union interviews section of the paper.
A recurrent ANC argument was that apartheid, inequality and capitalism were integrally related and hence that strong state intervention was needed to create a more equitable and acceptable economic system. To the business community the most controversial statements were those implying that nationalization was a means of obtaining capital for redistribution. The pro nationalisation view was expressed by Mandela in 1991 (Johnson, 1991) when he declared 'Nationalization is a demand which is reasonable from our point of view. Where do we get the capital and resources to tackle the national issues facing us? ' (Nattrass, 1994) . This policy saw the eradication of poverty and unemployment as being important objectives of development and as a result placed less emphasis on economic growth. It was a strategy that was in direct contradiction to policies imposed on many African counties by the World Bank/IMF, namely the structural adjustment policies, which are aimed mainly at increasing efficiency or output. At the pre-election stage at least, the ANC's reconstruction policies were more concerned with changing power relations, redistribution (through or for growth) and justice for all -politically, economically and socially. (Coetzee, 1993) .
The most important pronouncement on the ANC's economic thinking which epitomised the ideological/rhetorical changes the ANC were undergoing were to be found in the 1990 Discussion Document on Economic Policy, which although retained a commitment to state intervention contained a definite move away from a commitment to a state controlled economy. Although, the Macroeconomic Research Group, the largest group of ANC-aligned economists, still maintained that economic and political options could not be separated, and the state should still wield direct taxation and other fiscal inducements as a means of compelling large-scale industry and mining to make financial contributions to the redistributive process; it nevertheless, failed to promote the drastic restructuring that depicted earlier economic planning (Murray, 1994) .
It was evident, that following its unbanning the ANC would attempt to transform itself from an exiled South African liberation movement into a government. However, although a far cry from the days when the ANC wanted a state controlled economy the problem still remained that many economic analysts expressed doubts about the financial viability of some of its programmes which were seen as fuelling inflation. In addition, the ANC was perceived as having a left-wing pedigree run by activists more used to planning how to bring down power cables than holding down inflation. More specifically, the fear was that like so many other African governments it would attempt to run the economy by promoting public-sector jobs whilst destroying private-sector ones with protection and labour regulation. Therefore the merest hint of nationalisation during the ANC's election campaign sent business into a frenzy (Ajulu, 1993) . For example, in 1990, De Beers announced that it was relocating a substantial portion of its diamond operations to Switzerland immediately after Mandela announced that he was still in favour of nationalisation of the mines. This caused a radical rethink by the ANC, as Hebst (1994, p 159) put it,
The ANC leader then beat a hasty retreat and the Congress began a difficult rethinking of policy which resulted in the subsequent rejection of nationalisation as a viable policy option.
Consequently, when the ANC produced their draft resolution in 1991, the tone was somewhat milder. A business audience was clearly in mind, economic policy was portrayed as flexible and pragmatic. By the time the 1992 draft policy guidelines (DPG) appeared, ANC economic policy had become noticeably more business friendly. It made no references to restructuring or regulating the financial sector and even proposed that the role of the public sector might be reduced through privatization! Although this was later revised to 'reducing the public sector in certain areas in ways that will enhance efficiency, advance affirmative action and empower the historically disadvantaged while ensuring the protection of both consumers and the rights and employment of workers'. Overall the tone was highly supportive of market forces (Nattrass, 1994) .
The ANC's main preoccupation was on calming nerves about its' 5 year reconstruction and development programme, a document that represented the ANC's de facto manifesto and had the support of the trade union federation, Cosatu and the South African Community Party. The ANC claimed to have no plans to raise taxes to finance the programme, arguing it will be paid for by a simple refocussing of current priorities and greater efficiency in the use of resources. Consequently, it came as no surprise that Nelson Mandela's first budget was a model of moderation. Presented by Derek Keys, his then finance minister, on June 22nd, 1994 it promised a special pot of 2.5 billion rand for post-apartheid reconstruction, exactly what Mandela vowed in his election campaign. Keys pledged that the reconstruction fund would grow over the next 4 years to 12.5 billion rand in 1998-99. However, the dismantling of the old state and the creation of a new one had run up a hefty bill, a total of 4 billion rand that year; the election alone, cost nearly 1 billion rand. Therefore, personal income-tax payers earning over 50,000 rand -which excludes almost all blacks and most whites -and companies were to face a new 5% "transitional levy" for one year to help pay these costs. However, the corporate tax rate was set to shrink from 40% to 35%. In addition, some of the loss was to be made up by a rise in dividends tax from 15% to 25%. Nonetheless, absent was any mention of the 'wealth taxes' -on swimming pools, second homes and capital gains-so favoured by ANC radicals and dreaded by the rich. The Johannesburg stock exchange barely moved. Perhaps the black townships were less easily contented (Economist 25 June, 1994).
One explanation of the change in ideology could be seen as being due to the ANC's failure to construct a socio-economic restructuring programme independent of the existing worldwide capitalist system and so it was forced to comply with the conventions of the market-driven doctrine. Their style had become far more adaptable, making mention of a 'mixed economy' within the existing establishment. Both at home and abroad Mandela began to make a series of significant movements toward big business that smacked strongly of the ANC leadership welcoming the market-governed ideals of the free-enterprise system. On the 24th September (199?) Mandela made a speech to the United Nations which clearly expressed pro-business views. Two weeks later, he confirmed to the CBI that the ANC was committed to a generally free-market economy. In an address to South African businessmen the following month, he declared that in order to avoid losing overseas investment the ANC would be abandoning its ideological commitment to 'nationalization' of the mines and banks. (Murray,1994) . As a consequence, the twin objectives of restoring business confidence and attracting foreign investment seemed now to dominate. Most significantly, the ANC seemed to accept that the sums in the reconstruction and development programme would not add up; well at least not without a substantial injection of money from outside institutions like the IMF/World Bank. These arguments, along with the sudden collapse of commandist-style centralized planning in the Soviet union and Eastern Europe, appeared to influence the ANC leadership. It is clearly impossible to know the exact influences on the ANC leadership, but, it is possible that the collapse of the former Eastern Block economies (and especially of the collapse of the former Soviet Union) meant a significant removal of ideological support from the ANC and the South African Communist Party (SACP). Furthermore, the changes in Eastern Europe significantly reduced the choice of potential trading partners. The ANC responded to pleas from so called teams of experts to abandon its proposed inward industrialization programme in favour of a more 'realistic, investment-led, export-oriented growth strategy (Murray, 1994) .
The complete turnabout in ANC privatisation policy was officially announced in December 1995, after an extensive campaign mounted by capital. Deputy President Thabo Mbeki announced that following a unanimous Cabinet decision he was to preside over a new cabinet committee designed to speed up the "restructuring of State assets". It is worth noting the careful avoidance of the "p" [1] word. The Financial Times (7/12/95) reported that the cabinet had already decided that the proceeds from any sales would be used to reduce official debt and that the private sector warmly welcomed the government's announcement. The recommendations for supporting privatisation came from sectoral task groups convened in September 1995 by public enterprises Minister Stella Sigcau. Her advisor was a Deloitte Touche partner. The accounting profession and the Rand merchant Bank (RMB) have been at the centre of promoting new right economic ideology to business and to government in South Africa. The next section considers the role of the accounting profession in South Africa insofar as they have provided consultancy advice to the Mandela government.
The Role of the Accounting Profession
The strengthening of the world bank's commitment to privatisation and the conterminous strengthening and development of New Right ideology have led to the formation of one of the world's fastest growing businesses. A global industry, dominated by the accounting profession, has grown up in advising governments how to reform their public sectors and designing and carrying out privatisation programmes (Martin, 1993) . Martin, 1993 writes that some privatisation advisors and New Right ideologues think exactly alike. Dimitri Plionis is from Ernst and Young's Washington office and responsible for privatisation activities in Latin America. He wrote about the trends away from state ownership of assets as if it were a mass miracle -"realisation of a monumental, historical error occurred to developed and developing countries occurred to developed and developing countries in the late 1970s and early 1980s" (martin, 1993, p 16) . The big accounting firms are using their lucrative privatisation "skills" in South Africa as in the rest of the world.
The September 1995 government consultation document on privatisation prepared for the Cabinet was coordinated by Deloitte Touche partner and government advisor Jeff van Rooyen. A report in the Financial Mail (8/9/95) discusses the technical issues surrounding privatisation brought out in the report-"Though privatisation experts agree that ideological issues should not form part of the debate on what has become the sophisticated, technical matter of privatisation... Restructuring of State assets requires careful pre-sale preparation that calls for flexibility. Van Huysteen (Price Waterhouse, Meyernel corporate finance CE) stresses the need for sound direction of the process. On this score Morrison (Rand merchant Bank) and Van Huyssteen stress that governments should listen to the dictates of the market and supply potential investors with as much information as possible." [10] privatisation
In an earlier article (25/8/95) the Financial Mail suggested that the new government needed to be "pragmatic" and forget about "ideology".
to restructure a modern economy..from primarily satisfying the needs of the rich minority to meeting the legitimate aspirations of the previously disadvantaged is like reversing the course of a fully laden bulk tanker.... both transitions require much patience and an acceptance of what is feasible in the real world, as distinct from what is ideologically correct....
The divide (between Ministers), broadly, is between those who've come to realise that without economic growth general upliftment is impossible --they don't care what colour the cat is as long as it catches the mice --and those who have not shaken off the baggage of the liberation era.
It is interesting that the press (in the same way as New Right ideologues) use the signifier ideology in a very specific manner. They use ideology to mean something that isn't the truth, at its most benign, something utopian. This means that they would maintain that their economic position is non-ideological. It is natural. The dictates of the market are natural and should therefore be encouraged and accepted. To these theorists, there is simply no question that (for example) the dictates of free market economists should be discussed only insofar as one needs to ensure the best technical way of implementing them. To the New Right ideology is a schematic, inflexible way of seeing the world, as against some more modest, piecemeal pragmatic wisdom (Bell, 1962; Aron, 1957) . Eagleton (1991) notes that for the American political theorist Edward Shils, ideologies are explicit, closed, resistant to innovation, promulgated with a great deal of affectivity and require total adherence from their devotees. Making the workings of capitalism appear to be natural makes the resistance of New Right Ideology difficult. Privatisation, along with wage restraint, flexible working and job cuts, have it seems become the natural solution to South Africa's economic problems. This way of setting up the debate helps to mask the fact that there are still many competing interests within South Africa.
The unquestioned use of free market rhetoric by ANC leaders at least in their public pronouncements could in part be linked to advice they receive from the accounting profession. One of the key Ministers involved in privatisation is Stella Sigcau, Public Enterprises Minister is advised by Jeff van Rooyen, a partner in Deloitte Touche. Sigcau is reported to have said that "Our government has moved sufficiently forward to abandon a policy of nationalisation. It is unlikely that we would adopt a position that is inflexible and to the detriment of SA." The same article also attributes her with, admitting that privatisation has stimulated economic growth internationally, arguing that she does not want to replace one monopoly with another but that competitiveness remains a priority. Sigcau and the cabinet appear to have made up their minds that simply commercialising State assets is not enough. "Commercialisation has been useful in that it has put a worth on State assets and avoided the potentially untimely selling-off of family silver," says Van Huyssteen (Financial Mail, 15/9/95). Sometimes the same players participate in both camps. For example Alwyn Martin is both a Telkom board director (a parastatal, probably the first in line for privatisation), Vodacom chairman and a senior partner of Ernst and Young in Cape Town. It seems likely that Ernst and Young would be in first in line to give advice concerning the privatisation of Telkom.
Aside from giving advice on privatisation, the accounting profession in South Africa maintains its links with government by giving advice on many issues which would normally be considered to be outside of its sphere of financial expertise. This is in common with much of the rest of the world. The accounting profession in South Africa has been called upon to give neutral advice on such diverse matters as labour relations, the 2004 Olympics [1] and the reorganisation of support services to parliament. For example, on expressing an opinion about how to encourage investment, Aziz Dieye (of Coopers and Lybrand in Dakar) moved very quickly to the issue of labour. He postulated that conditions for private investment are "difficult to achieve in countries that have been limited to supplying raw materials and whose economies have consistent essentially of government monopolies. However, certain steps can be taken to improve the climate for investment..... Reforming relations with labour unions is a pressing need since they are characterised by reflexes and political attitudes dating from the struggle for independence. Their demands are often beyond the reach of faltering economies" (Financial mail, October 6 1995).
A South African firm, Kenneth Mgqamqo & Associates joined forces with Deloitte and Touche to recommend ways of reorganising support services for Parliament. Their joint fee was R430,000 plus direct disbursements. But the consortium was racked by internal tensions partly because Deloitte was considered to be too inflexible, treating Parliament like a business. However, part of the tension was also reported as being racial. The South African representatives of Deloitte and Touche were white, male and Afrikaners; the people of colour on the team were all from Kenneth Mgqampo. (Guardian, 15/9/95). At the same time as those involved with this venture were expressing their concerns with the way things were going, Deputy Auditor-General Professor Bertie Loots reported that millions of rands of taxpayers money was spent on consultants in 1995 revealing a "bizarre dependence on consultants" (Guardian 22/9/95).
Structural changes proposed by the South African Institute of Chartered Accountants (Saica) to create a four-tier career ladder of students, accounting technicians, general accountants and chartered accountants could ensure that the elite and lucrative advice giving-role of accountants remains at the top rung of the ladder and is distanced from the more mundane house-keeping accounting role kept lower down the ladder. At present in South Africa there is a "second-tier" accounting structure with the Institute of Commercial and Financial Accountants providing accounting support staff for commerce and industry and accounting services to smaller businesses [1] . Saica's structural changes may well take business away from the Institute of [11] Cape Town appointed five accounting firms as financial controllers of its bid! Ernst and Young will be bid committee financial controller; Deloitte and Touche will audit the bid; Mustaq & Brey will undertake the accounting of the bid; KPMG will make an economic assessment of it; and Coopers and Lybrand will assist in the preparation of the budget for the games.
[12] Graduate status and articles are prerequisites to students wishing to qualify as chartered accountants. These are prohibitive to many disadvantaged students. The Institute of Commercial and Financial Accountants requires an academic accounting-centred component and a practical component in which experience in practical accounting is assessed. This has Commercial and Financial Accountants. But Saica may be more concerned about giving the government advice on privatisation than with producing "reliable" information to business. Monica Singer, institute technical director is reported as saying (Financial Mail, 3/11/95 ) that the general level of financial reporting by SA's quoted companies is far from satisfactory, if compliance with institute standards is the criterion. In 1992, the last time the institute held its financial reporting competition before giving up in despair, of the 400 listed industrial companies that entered, only 70 passed the initial screening. Even the winner failed to comply fully with the Statements of Generally Accepted Accounting Practice codified by the Accounting Practices Board [1] . This failure results, she maintains, in stock exchange analysts having to guess, because the information they receive is nonsense --or at least not guaranteed to be reliable. This uncertainty also discourages foreign investment.
It could be argued that the accounting profession is more concerned with making profits from consultancy that with mundane issues like accounting standards. The ideological framework presented by accountants and changes in government policy has put enormous strain on the tripartite alliance with the SACP and Cosatu. Therefore, in order to contextualise the unique problems confronting the ANC government in terms of changes in policy, it is important to analyze the nature of the ANC itself and its relationship with the alliance with a view to perceiving why the current ANC economic thinking is moulded by both technical economic arguments and political considerations rather than simple ignorance (Nattrass, 1994).
The Tripartite Alliance
The historical circumstances of the unbanning of the ANC means that it is not exclusively a political party, it has pledged itself to a coalition with the SACP and Cosatu to such an extent that the prevailing paradigm shift in socio-economic discourse and policy discussions has major ramifications. When the ANC was unbanned it became clear that many leading trades unionists were also ANC members and members of the SACP [1] . Historically the co-dependency and support shared between the three organisations is unique. The Congress movement was and is opened the door for less privileged students and 20% of membership and nearly 50% of students are from disadvantaged communities. [13] In 1996, Ernst and Young changed their rules for the Financial Mail/Ernst and Young Annual Accounts Award to enable an objective and consistent approach to the evaluation of all industrial companies. Credit is only given for disclosure of specific information --aesthetic presentation is not considered.
[14] Following its unbanning, the SACP disclosed its public leadership, which included prominent trade unionist like NUMSA, general secretary Moses Mayekiso (M.P) and Vice President of Cosatu, John Gomomo (Pres. Cosatu). What was significant was Cosatu and the SACP had not only formed an alliance but these supposedly separate organisations now had a shared leadership.
clearly a national liberation movement containing various political tendencies. The ANC and SACP have long been old allies and have shared a number of political convictions. The SACP saw apartheid as a 'Colonialism of a Special Type', The Path to Power, the programme adopted in 1989 stated that 'the colonial ruling class with its white support base on the one hand and the oppressed colonial majority on other are located within a single country'. The removal of this 'internal colonialism' required 'a national democratic revolution which would overthrow the colonial state and establish a united, democratic and non-racial South Africa', (Callinicos, 1992) [1]
.
However, now that national liberation has been achieved, the SACP still has a commitment (now evidently postponed) to pursue what it called the "second phase" of the struggle, namely socialism. But as the likelihood of the end of apartheid approached, the SACP began to move steadily away from any real desire to fight for this second phase. Jo Slovo, the then SACP leader is reported to have told the Board of Directors of Woolworths, "socialism and the market are not, as its commonly supposed, opposed to each other in principle. The market is a mechanism for the realisation of value, there is nothing inherently capitalistic about it" (Business Day 12/12/90, quoted in Callinicos, 1996, p 11). By 1991 Slovo, was declaring quite unequivocally that 'the SACP has rejected the prescription of nationalisation as part of the programme of the party ' (Munck, 1994) . No doubt the events in the USSR and Eastern Europe had a major bearing on this change of policy, the ideological support offered to communist parties throughout the world by the former Soviet Union, has now virtually disappeared. For now at least the SACP, to the extent that it can be distinguished from the ANC leadership, is unlikely to directly challenge the ANC's policy change, supposedly because it reportedly needs the ANC much more than the other way round (Financial Mail, 22 April 1994) .
The issue is a little more problematic for Cosatu. No less than 50 Cosatu leaders, many of them very senior officials, took up political office after April, 1994 (Callinicos, 1996) . As a rule trade union leaders have expressed a commitment to a socialist future. Cosatu has consistently called for a democratically planned economy with 'workers control', equality for all based on the [15] Nevertheless, as Callinicos (1992) explains, negotiations as opposed to Guerilla warfare was conceded by the ANC leadership to be the most productive method of accomplishing this 'national democratic revolution'. By 1990 the ANC admitted that they did not have the ability 'to intensify the armed struggle in any meaningful way' (ANC Secretary-General Alfred Nzo). No doubt the 1984-6 rising induced many ANC activists to visualize the defeat of the regime by mass insurrection; and the ANC call to the masses to render South Africa 'ungovernable' did not seem unreasonable. However, it transpires that the ANC were never serious about that possibility and subsequent meetings with white establishment figures as early as 1985 showed they envisaged negotiations as an alternative to the armed struggle. Callinicos (1990) argues, that the most feasible explication of the ANC's leadership's real strategy was that it had a long-term orientation towards a negotiated settlement and that various methods-armed struggle, strikes, township risings, peaceful protests, and economic sanctions were all forms of pressure meant to coerce the regime into talking to the ANC and securing the most favourable terms. collective ownership of the economy. For some trade union militants (and ANC radicals) the current direction of the ANC economic thinking, its relinquishing of policy statements on using the state to redress long-standing structural inequities seems inconceivable, and appears only to be making remarkable concessions to the neo-liberal monetarists (Callinicos, 1992) .
The advent of a black workers' movement based on Cosatu has been one of the most important attainments of the anti-apartheid conflict. The leading trade union strategy of workplace control and increased participation in centralized collective bargaining at the sectoral level has achieved substantial gains for the organised workers and strengthened the self-confidence of the labour movement (Murray, 1994) . Gradual growth was experienced from the beginning of the mid 1970s and only levelled off in the early 1990s. Membership in registered trade unions alone accounted for over 40% of the labour force, thereby making South Africa one of the most heavily unionized countries in the world (Callinicos, 1992) . By 1994 trade union membership including the estimated 450,000 workers in independent unions, approximated 3.2 million wage earners or about 23% of the economically active (Murray, 1994) . However, the growth of the non-racial democratic trade-union movement and the venture to align them to the ANC was a highly perplexing and uneven process sparked off by the 1973 Durban 'wildcat' strike wave. Murray (1994) attempts to identify three distinct areas of conflict and accommodation which provides some understanding of their development -the workplace, the sectoral and national levels.
At the enterprise level, workers were and are confronted by the full impact of apartheid on the shop floor. It was here that the growth of the shop stewards movement cemented the nonracial trade unions presence in the workplace. The trade unions used rank-and-file militancy, to revolutionise an instinctive mass movement into a more harmonious organizational body. Almost certainly, the organised labour movement sabotaged the institutionalised managerial prerogative setting up new patterns of working and defying management authority, for too long shielded by the apartheid system. Nevertheless, it was only from the mid 1980s, that as a result of these shopfloor struggles, collective bargaining at a sectoral level began to develop. Centralized negotiations and participation in industrial councils replaced plant-level 'bargaining [1] . In practice, though the South African industrial relations system was a bureaucratic tangle, relying on voluntary participation with the industrial council system [1] which never really developed into a coherent industry wide framework. Most of the councils were regional or local tending to compensate unevenly the most powerfully organized unions, and invoking comments from liberal observers who spoke in gloating terms of the emergence of [16] The most significant change came with the 1979 amendments to the 1924 Industrial Conciliation Act when registration privileges were extended to African workers allowing them to form trade unions. The new labour relations Act (LRA) will provide a comprehensive framework for labour relations allowing for the creation of an independent commission for conciliation, mediation and arbitration; Workers elected forums to facilitate consultation and joint decision-making with management; and the setting up of a new labour court (Financial Times, July 1995).
[17] It provided a mechanism for resolving work-related disputes but left the interpretation of 'unfair labour practices' to the courts a unionized labour aristocracy [1] .
It was only after 1990 that it was possible to observe the trade union movement beginning to function effectively at national level and influencing macro-economic policy [1] . Although it sat on statutory bodies such as, the National Training Board, National Housing Forum, National Electricity Forum and the National Economic Forum (NEF), its most significant periods were those when it organised countrywide stoppages such as the Cosatu-led anti-VAT coalition which accomplished the highly successful November 1991 general strike. Nonetheless, whilst operating at a national level, the leading trade unions began to modify their tactics; abandoning 'militant abstentionism' from decisions affecting productivity and profitability and immersing themselves in key economic considerations, involving pragmatic alliances with management. ' The flexible accommodation', or strategic unionism' involved gradual structure reforms and was thought capable of undermining the capitalist system by freeing an impetus that would launch the labour movement on the road to socialism [1] . In other words it was felt possible to link the bread-and-butter issues with the long-term goals of socialist transformation (Murray, 1994) .
It was 2 main federations, Cosatu & NACTU [1] which steered the surge of progressive tradeunionism and achieved the extraordinary expansion in black semi-skilled and unskilled membership. As a consequence, Cosatu and Nactu were seen as essential to the ANC's strategy of negotiations and attempts were made to enlist them into the ANC-dominated popular front (Callinicos, 1990) . However this task was not simple, and resulted in bitter internal feuds between workerists [1] and populists. Known as the 'workerist-populist' debate it involved [18] In reality this so called 'labour aristocracy' had begun to temper their demands during the recession out of fear of triggering mass lay-offs [19] Currently, Cosatu as a member of the National Economic, Development and Labour Council (Nedlac), a vehicle for achieving consensus between ministers, employers and unions on a range of issues,is helping sketch the final draft of the new labour relations bill for submitting for cabinet indorsement (Financial Times, July 1995) [20] In reality, most managers implemented the most up-to-date schemes without reference to the unions. True, national level officials negotiated the principles of team-work and codetermination with employers but on the shop floor management simply threatened wholesale retrenchments if agreements could not be reached on flexibility, multi-tasking and new work schedules. (Murray, 1994) [21] . By 1988 it was clear the federation had moved much closer to the PAC and so would not be seeking unity with COSATU. However, from the outset they were overshadowed by the stronger & better organised COSATU and many workers voted with their feet and joined COSATU (Murray, 1994) .
[22] Workerist were those who confined themselves to economistic (wages & hours) issues and according to Callinicos (1988) , failed to understand the relevance of broader working class fight to the struggle. They rejected the ANC-SACP two stages strategy, arguing for a socialist revolution along side the national liberation struggle. Their main focus was building a strong politically independent trade union organisation, often at the expense of building a alterative approaches to building the labour movement. The issues are profound because at the centre lies the difficulty of what political role the trade unions should play in the New South Africa, namely should they align themselves to ANC Alliance (Callinicos, 1988) .
From the beginning the workerist-led unions such as NUMSA were in a weaker position to that of the popularist led NUM. They endorsed a Workers' Charter and positioned workers rights and socialism squarely on the political agenda but still failed to annul calls from the 'popularists' to swear loyalty to the Freedom Charter and the national liberation struggle. Indeed by the time the Freedom Charter had been adopted by the 1987 Congress it was apparent that the 'Workerists' had lost and Cosatu was identifying with the ANC (Murray, 1994) . What actually transpired was the 'workerist' and 'populist' tendencies had moved towards a 'strategic compromise'. Over time, this was to secure Cosatu, the ANC and SACP into a tripartite alliance (Lipton & Simkins, 1993) .
Of particular interest is Cosatu's long-term relationship with the ANC. Whilst the Trade Union movement in South Africa is clearly flourishing, it must be remembered that trade union members represent a fairly elite group within South Africa, namely they are the people with the jobs. Whereas the trade union movements' main consideration is the protection of their members' jobs the ANC's constituency is a little broader, it must concern itself with the whole of the South Africa population (Murray, 1994) . Needless to say rising wage demands could jeopardize the ANC's reconstruction and development which relies on weighty capital investment. Should the unions refuse to forgo their demands there is a risk that they will endanger the ANC's budget as investors decline to contribute. Should this happen there could be a show down with unions. For certain the ANC-union alliance was always set to become more problematic once the common enemy apartheid had be expatiated but its difficult to see the Cosatu general-secretary Sam Shilowa a solid ANC/SACP member defying the ANC, especially now its acquired the legitimacy of an elected government. Nevertheless, given the ANC's broader constituency consists of 50% unemployed there is likely to be a reordering of priorities. Whether this is accepted by the union, remains to be seen (Murray, 1994 ).
An alternative may involve containing the union militancy by bringing the leadership into the decision-making process. The new government could well arrive at some sort of labour contract with the trade unions. Already there have been calls from Cosatu for so called 'reconstruction accords ' 'social contract' and 'co-determination pacts' . They all support some accommodation between organized labour, the State and Capital. John Gommono, vice-president of Cosatu expressed the position of the trade unions in 1991 thus:'We are moving from resistance to reconstruction. We need to move away from sloganising. We must make concrete proposals on workers' rights and reconstructing the economy. As Munck (1994) explains, this position implies the need for reconstruction pact or accord between unions, capital and the new postapartheid state.
party. In opposition, the popularists or 'nationalists' looked to the confrontations in the community . They saw role of the trade unions within an coalition led by the ANC and rivetted on the 'national-democratic' struggle.
For many on the left this was cause for concern, for example, Callinicos states that 'when I first heard talk of social contracts ....(1990) my blood ran cold ' and Bashier Vally (1992) argues that a social contract can only mean that labour will have to compromise too much. From this perspective, class collaboration means the development of a union bureaucracy which undermines democracy and accountability. Even the usually supportive Steve Friedman argued that the social contract could become a vehicle ensuring that only the best organized benefit from the compromise (Friedman,1992) . However, trade-union analysts like Jeremy Baskin who welcomed this tendency argues that South Africa is different, it is not the same as the old a reformist social democracy aimed at stabilising capitalism, instead it signals a real contest to the wisdom of profit-making itself. He sees corporatist deal-making representing tactical compromises and in no way jeopardising the pursuit of socialist goals (Baskin, 1993) . Even in the 1980s, when it was impossible for management to unilaterally impose coercive methods to increase productivity, employers were finding new forms of collaboration and partnership with organized labour. Even the strongest unions were introduced to 'participative management' schemes like Quality Circles, Just-in-time and Green Area in the hope of securing co-operation. Indeed, as will be seen in the later section on interviews with Trade Union leaders involved with privatisations, some bought into this rhetoric (but see Arnold, 1995 which shows a more long term picture of US unions which went along with participative management schemes).
Therefore, the real question is: will the co-opted former union leaders come to be accepted or will they be seen as sell-outs by rank-and-file members when they urge restraint? Awareness of this could well produce subtle manoeuvres from a new government which will not want to seem intolerant or suppressive towards the unions. However, if it does come to be perceived as such, the ANC may face a split in the union and its own ranks, with hardline syndicalists hiving off to form a pure workers party. In the end though, if the ANC can't come to a compromise with the unions, which essentially means the unions reining in themselves it is hard to see the alliance surviving. (Financial Mail, 22 April, 1994) .
The above debate outlines some of the complex issues surrounding the governing of South Africa. It was only after the unbanning of the ANC that it was possible to see the "cross membership" between leading Trade Unions, the ANC and the SACP. Thus if the ANC want to continue with their privatisation plans in order to attract investment into South Africa, they may well have to convince the Tripartite Alliance. However, it does seem that several leading ANC/SACP members will support the ANC government's privatisation plans; but, it may turn out to be much more difficult to convince shop steward and rank and file union members.
In a 1995 interview between Cosatu general secretary Sam Shilowa and his old COSATU comrade, now minister without portfolio, Jay Naidoo, the issue of privatisation arose. Naidoo said that
We must demystify privatisation because the government has decided that there needs to be a restructuring of the public sector..... government owns certain things that are of no use to government. We should not be the biggest landowner because we should be using government land to meet the land reform programme. In consultation with Cosatu, through Nedlac, the private sector and communities, we need to decide on the areas government should be involved in.
(Reported in The Shopsteward, Vol 4, No 3, 1995) In the same edition of The Shopsteward three former Cosatu leaders who had been chosen as ANC MPs (Godfrey Oliphant, Chris Dlamini, and Susan Shabangu) were also asked about privatisation because it "is one potential conflict area between the government and Cosatu"-Dlamini says the government has not yet taken a decision on the matter.
"I don't believe privatisation is the way to raise finances by the government." says Dlamini. "I am not opposed to it in toto, but some strategic enterpriseslike Eskom, Telekom, the hospitals and Water Boards -are the backbone of the economy, and should not be privatised." It was questionable whether the government would find buyers for less profitable state enterprises, he said.
Oliphant says he is not opposed to the privatisation of certain state institutions, like government buildings, but he also opposes the privatisation of important public institutions as this was "not in the public interest".
Shabangu assures the trade union movement that, before there is privatisation, "all stakeholder will be consulted", as if it is going to compromise labour, "this will create problems".
With respect to the SACP and Cosatu, the ANC would rather work with hegemonic consent rather than coercion (Lehman and Tinker, 1987) . There is still strong resistance to privatization amongst Cosatu members many fearing that privatisation will lead to job losses. Most of the ANC, including ministers, remain strongly opposed to any restructuring which smack of the approach adopted by the British Conservative governments of the past 15 years. ANC official Jeremy Cronin told a Cosatu conference "We must fight at all costs the selling of resources that are essential to meeting social needs" [1] . The following section is based on a series of interviews carried out with members of South African Municipal Workers Union (SAMWU) a Cosatu affiliate in Cape Town during 1993 who had been directly affected by the local authority privatisation carried out during the 1980s by the De Klerk government. This privatization took the form of "contracting out".
Trade Union Privatisation Concerns
In a country with a powerful trade union movement flushed with recent victories, closely allied with one of the last mass Communist Parties in the world, and one which has strong historic links with the government in office, it would be reasonable to ask where resistance to privatisation and the interests of capital might come? It seems likely that if their is to be any effective resistance to privatisation in South Africa, especially if it will also involve job losses, it will come from the Trade Union movement. Job losses is the major concerns of unionists [23] quoted in Business week, 21 November, 1994, p 50. (reflecting the experience of privatizations in other countries). For example one interviewee stated that I've seen information regarding the privatisation of the Water (in the UK), the cuts in staff, the Chomeal place disaster in Cornwall, the way the services have deteriorated. But tell me why when you have unions of a million members you weren't able to stop it?
One official for SAMWU, responsible for collective bargaining in the region put the matter this wayIn the short-term it is in the form of reconstruction and development, in the longterm it means resuscitating capitalists, getting capitalism out of the crisis. Unions should learn that privatisation decimated the unions in Britain.
The concern of South African trade unionists with events in the UK may be in part coloured by the fact that the interviewer was from the UK; however, the experiences of UK privatisations are a concern of trade unionists worldwide. Absolutely consistent with capitalism's drive to maximise profits, former state owned enterprises have become profit making by sacking large sections of their workforces and introducing "flexible working". In a country with 50% unemployment, this is a serious concern. The interviewees also felt more general social concerns relating to making profits from essential services. For example
The general feeling among member is that privatisation is not on! For two reasons, one its a question of job security and so there is a general opposition to the private sector and what they see happening. Secondly its a question of provision of services, the concept of services for profit in fact is not acceptable.
Full-time SAMWU official
The feelings in the workplace are strongly against privatisation, especially when it effects their job security and the council can't give long-term guarantees that their jobs will be secure. Organiser at SAMWU Workers do fear privatisation...... Amongst the rank and file there's concern but they're just waiting, there's both an element of fear and anger. Education Officer -Works for Water works
There appeared to be a strong belief that unions can prevent privatisation. This is potentially a major problem for the ANC government at present, since they want to encourage overseas investment in South Africa. Their job of attracting funds will be made more difficult if South Africa is going through a period of industrial unrest.
We threatened them with industrial action and so they backed down from complete privatisation. The Abattoir have been the only area, they are now faced with 6 options, which are being put to the workers. Organiser at SAMWU A full-time SAMWE official said but in my opinion there will be no wholesale privatisation of local authorities.
One of the reasons for this is that some of the experiments of privatisation have been unsuccessful, for example the privatisation of the supply of cleansing vehicles in the Muzienburg area hasn't really worked and the council is anxious to get out of this contract now. So I don't believe there will be privatisation of major services such as cleansing, water supply, education etc. partly for this reason.
The other reason is the strength of the union movement has managed to stop privatisation or at best managed to change the initial intention to privatise. But long-term strength of the union to stop privatisation is still uncertain at the moment. Obviously with the changing conditions as a result of a new government there is a possibility of a greater union influence, but with that influence comes of the question of union ties. Nevertheless, I don't see wholesale privatisation, at least not in the short-term.
The same union official explained his union's form of opposition to privatization as followsWe've campaigned in terms of resolutions which give a clear position opposing privatisation, meetings with communities and getting fully involved in building up civic structures, creating an awareness via propaganda, either collectively via Cosatu or via the public sector forum. We've tried to broaden the struggle by trying to link up with the privatisation in the S.A Railways, postal services, although we do see the Municipal sector as slightly different.
But, whilst opposed to privatization, some union members still considered the opposition to apartheid to dominatesee there's just too few hands. Obviously, Apartheid put tremendous strains on the union organisation, which we're in the process of trying to overcome. At the moment we see many more serious issues (than privatisation) such as the socioeconomic problems of the country.
Because Apartheid still divides it's difficult to take up the issues.
Treasury shop steward
Despite the resistance to privatisation amongst the SAMWU members interviewed, these members were aware of and to some extent have taken on board financial rhetoric.
Within the City Council itself there are new developments. They are restructuring the Departments along more business levels. The structure has been reorganised, its more like a pyramid with the top flattened which means there will be more top management, mostly white managers. They are arguing there is not value for money inefficiency of administration and processing of work... SAMWU shop steward and Executive member Take the question of electricity privatisation, ESKOM. We agree that the reorganisation may help economies of scale but the major question is one of control, what kind of structure is important to ESKOM, who is going to control the vast monopoly, who will benefit from the large amounts of money that's generated. But in Cosatu some of the other unions are going full steam a head to accept ESKOM privatisation, see it in terms of a narrow union perspective, see themselves gaining thousands of members as workers transferred over, for example, NUMSA stands to gain many members. However, we see it in terms of the effect it will have on public sector, on the control of services. Full-time official for SAMWU, responsible for collective bargaining in the region
The main type of privatisation is the privatisation of the land, the selling off of council land to private contractors. However, the council has used private labour for many years. Why even upstairs in the Housing Development you find people who have been working for 20/30 years but still have no tenure.
[1] Often though the council has been forced to use external labour because they don't have their own expertise. You see I'm not necessary against privatisation, especially if it is used as an efficiency model. Sometimes the selling of assets makes sense because the private sector can deliver more effectively (although not necessarily more efficiently). However, privatisation is not a universal panacea.
Town Planner, Town planning Dept. SAMWU member Last year they wanted to sell off the Abattoir, they guaranteed the unions no retrenchments and redeployment for anyone. But the union SAMWU still said no! There's a compelling economic reason to sell off the Abattoir, it needs R60m spent on it in order to upgrade.....unless the Abattoir is upgraded the council will not be able to operate the factory because of Health reasons and they will lose their jobs.
Well its important to look at the existing local authorities and the new Metropolitan council which are to be introduced. There will be growing pressure from the Community plus local businesses to become more efficient and to keep rates down and yet still deliver the services which are required. So the new Metropolitan councils won't be able to resist that drive. Oh things won't change on the first day, they'll take a really hard look at the situation first. But for sure 'the Chickens will come home to roost'. They'll have to be greater accountability and responsibility and they will have to make decisions in line with the realities of life. Initially , the workforce may even expand, people will have huge expectations from the government. They expect better housing, electricity in the Townships, but things will change. Look they've even already replaced the meter reader by a card system in the townships and there's been very little mention of it.
SAMWU member
Since the 1994 elections there have been many strikes and the government has bitterly attacked any manifestation of direct action on the ground. "The police, armed with all the brutal apparatus familiar from the apartheid era of guns, batons, dogs, and teargas, were regularly mobilised against strikers" (Callinicos, 1996, p 30) . These strikes have inevitably put some strain on the relationship between the ANC and Cosatu This came to a head in December 1995 when the Mandela government openly capitulated to the worldwide trend towards flexibility and privatisation. Cosatu reacted with fury calling protest strikes on 13 December.
At a rally that day SARHWU [1] president Nelson Ndisina accused the GNU of behaving like "the previous National Party governments which took decisions on our behalf". And he declared, "As workers of South Africa, we will not allow anybody, I repeat anybody, to privatise". Callinicos, 1996, p 34 In terms of Cosatu's leadership this affair highlights the uncomfortable position of trade union bureaucrats everywhere. They are forced into balancing the inherently antagonistic interests if capital and labour. Cosatu called a general strike against privatisation on January 16th 1996. But this strike was cancelled at the last moment when the government made a few concessions to Cosatu regarding consultation procedures. Government advisor and Deloitte Touche partner Jeff van Rooyen is reported as saying that "we don't anticipate any difficulties at all" (Financial Mail, 19/1/96) over the issue of privatisation and that despite Cosatu opposition the government position "has not changed" (Financial Mail, 19/1/96) . Indeed at the time of writing it seems as if Telkom is busy preparing to privatise; the government has offered tax incentives to companies producing cellular equipment to enable Telkom to appear more attractive; and all of the big international telephone companies have set up office in South Africa determined to get in on the action. The picture is a depressingly familiar one.
Conclusion
The threat to democratic transition in South Africa cannot be over-emphasized. According to neo-classical economic views of the world the South African economy is simply not in a position to address the rising expectations of the oppressed. Worse still, foreign investment is [24] South African Railways and Harbour Workers Union not likely to satisfy the material expectations of the oppressed majority in the foreseeable future. Going along with the present economic structure of South Africa means that the workers in South Africa will face the full force of the increasingly competitive and cut-throat drive of capitalism in the 1990s. The ANC government have no choice but to define their problems using financial rhetoric; and it is likely that other issues will be side-lined and forgotten. One ANC activist told us that the ANC's concentration of the financial means that the government has not been addressing basic concerns like discriminatory employment contracts. But as Maphai (1993) explains, what cannot be predicted is the likely response. Simply believing that such dissatisfaction will prompt a violent uprising against the new state is an oversimplification. Such anger can be contained through various measures [1] . While it was acceptable to mobilize against a minority, racist regime, the situation changes when the former liberation movement wins power. An elected, multi-racial coalition government is more likely to clamp down with a degree of legitimacy and international acquiescence than a racist minority regime. This means that 'law and order' might be imposed where mass dissatisfaction threatens stability (Maphai, 1993) .
There are several important issues facing accounting researchers which can be considered through the events in South Africa. This is by no means meant to suggest that the South African experience can be translated elsewhere but that we might be able to use the South African experience to consider accounting concerns from a new perspective. The issue raised at the beginning of this paper relates to the potential outcomes of defining a situation or describing the world by using accounting/financial rhetoric. Would describing the world in this way be problematic in terms of leaving out other (perhaps more important) issues? It seems that in South Africa at least, it has. One of the drivers behind this is the economic base in South Africa; the ANC government are basically encircled by the economic system within which they are trying to operate. No matter, what their motives, their political consciousness, or their good intentions; the economic system dictates the need for increased investment, a drive towards making profits and therefore, the need to impose wage restraints, social welfare expenditure restrictions, and so on. The quantitative number of policy changes made by the South African government with respect to things like privatisation will in the end produce a qualitative change where the ANC is seen by many of its former supporters as an oppressive regime rather than a liberation one. Even the Trade Unionists interviewed used the newly emerging financial rhetoric of empowerment, quality circles, efficiency, economy and effectiveness and accountability. But can this financial/accounting rhetoric ever be used in a progressive way? The authors of this paper believe that because of the dialectical relationship between the rhetoric of accounting (or the financial) and the economic base, that such rhetoric can only be used to uphold that system. At present there is enormous goodwill towards South Africa in the international community and a great desire to give its leaders the benefit of the doubt and so there will be pressure on the Bank not to be particularly harsh. Hence, either institution may not be able to hold its ground.
[25] The government might introduce some visible but inexpensive material improvements, such as low-cost housing, that might engender a sense of hope. While it is impossible to meet all the people's needs , once they are convinced that there is light at the end of the tunnel, their demands would become tempered with reason.
Finally, World Bank conditionality even towards countries that are poor and highly indebted has often not been very significant because the world bank has yet to resolve the contradictions between being a development institution and an economic watchdog (Herbst,1994) . The IMF [1] and World Bank are not simply in the business of lending money they have the addition task of maintaining the smooth operation of the international capitalist system; an almost impossible task during the current world crisis.
Finally we would like to join Callinicos (1996) and emphasise that we do not see the unfolding events in South Africa as being the result of personal betrayals or backsliding by ANC ministers.
There can be few groups or individuals in the world with finer personal records of personal courage and sacrifice than Mandela and his ANC ministers. Rather the failure of the ANC in office to pursue any real attempt to transform society is a consequence of the strategy it has pursued. Like reformists at other places and times, the Revolutionary Alliance has made its genuine desire to achieve the "social upliftment" of the black majority conditional on the fortunes of capitalism in its country. But it has done so at a time when capitalism on a global scale is experiencing profound turbulence and instability. Callinicos, 1996, p 40 [26] In fact, the IMF which is in the business of lending money to governments to prop up their foreign exchange reserves, has already lent South Africa $850 million. But only after receiving from the transitional executive council(TEC) a letter which pledged policies which would 'couple wage restraint and training to foster investment'. In addition the World Bank seems set to channel large amounts of development assistant. Although, voices are decrying the involvement with the IMF, many are also arguing that without the aid of these international organisations the country cannot hope to reconstruct and develop itself.
